On Grammar Schools

The proposal by Theresa May, the new UK Prime Minister, to remove the block on the creation of new grammar schools, has prompted a predictable outcry from a surprising diversity of people who have adduced an equally surprising variety of objections. The most common objection is that selection at 11 by examination is unfair, premature and unreliable, a stressful matter for those coming up to the “11-plus” and no good indication of eventual “success”.

Comprehensive schools were always intended to remove the injustice of selection while preserving the best that all their predecessor schools offered, and therefore not only grammar schools but secondary moderns too, not all of which were as bad as is sometimes claimed.

The main problem Theresa May’s sudden reintroduction of this topic to education creates is that it tries to avoid a debate that is essential before our next major educational reform; indeed, it avoids it while presupposing a particular answer to it. My view is that the debate is essential, and the answer the reintroduction of grammar schools presupposes wrong.

Some will say that the line from universal comprehensives through academies and free schools (with the universalisation of academies not far behind) leads inexorably to the reintroduction of grammar schools, but this is a false inference that leads us down a dead-end. The key question we should ask, and ask of the best independent schools as well as academies and free schools, existing grammar schools and the most successful comprehensives, is what it is that they do that makes them successful.

The key question we should ask, and ask of the best independent schools as well as academies and free schools, existing grammar schools and the most successful comprehensives, is what it is that they do that makes them successful.

The answer, which we can only return to after a much longer excursion into another question, is that we make a difference to any life only by the quality of our interactions. The very best teaching makes children, pupils, students feel valued and affirmed, that they matter, that what they are doing is worthwhile and valuable. The very best teachers have generosity of spirit, a love and enthusiasm for their subject, and the intellectual hunger necessary to make them lifelong learners. These qualities communicate themselves to their students contagiously because they simultaneously affirm and inspire. Find any great school and you will find a school where the vast majority of the staff exhibit these qualities; find a failing school and you will find one where they do not. (There are parental and social aspects to this, too, of course, but they also reflect social values.)

The very best teachers have generosity of spirit, a love and enthusiasm for their subject, and the intellectual hunger necessary to make them lifelong learners. These qualities communicate themselves to their students contagiously because they simultaneously affirm and inspire.

It follows that the problem Theresa May is attempting to address by a return to grammar schools cannot be solved by such a move. The only thing that can solve it is the identification, training, professional development and reward (social and financial) of a new generation of teachers who exhibit these three qualities: generosity; enthusiasm; hunger. In other words, a regression to grammar schools is about taking the apparently easy route to a permanent educational solution because the costs and social changes needed to empower the new generation of teachers we need if all education is to be beneficial to all its client-groups is correspondingly difficult. But if we baulk at this challenge we will throw away the advances of the last fifty years in exactly the way we have just thrown away the achievements of the last forty years of membership of the European Union.

The only thing that can solve the deficiencies of our educational system is the identification, training, professional development and reward (social and financial) of a new generation of teachers who exhibit these three qualities: generosity; enthusiasm; hunger.

But we should ask a preparatory question about the meaning of educational success, which we often assume to be obvious, but is it?

Set aside for a moment all those stories about the badly-behaved kids who rebel against the system then leave school and become billionaires by exploiting their anti-establishment flair for entrepreneurship: no doubt there are some, but they will always be a tiny minority of the population. Ask instead what characteristics we would look and hope for in the successes education could point to.

Here we need to introduce a new concept borrowed from environmental science and applied to human science. Environmental science is increasingly focused upon lifetime characteristics of products: not that this light-bulb burns only 10% of the electricity of an incandescent bulb, but the mean cost from “cradle to grave”, from invention through manufacture to use to safe disposal. Attending too greatly to the wattage of the low-energy bulb compared with the shorter-lived and higher-energy incandescent creates attractive headline figures, but we need to take account of all the factors involved from the start of the process to its end.

So let’s introduce an equivalent human-resource measure we might call “lifetime effectiveness” that at least tries – I am not suggesting for a second that this is easy or even perhaps possible, but the idea it involves must be important to any measure of educational, which is to say human success – to measure our effectiveness as human beings “from cradle to grave” and then asks about the role of education in this process and tries to derive a measure of success accordingly.

Here, the equivalent of the headline-grabbing low-energy bulb’s wattage is the brightly-burning star we are so often shown as an indication of success, but a star which exhausts itself by 30, cannot cope with the anonymity of 40, and becomes a miserable drain on society at 60, 70, 80 if he or she doesn’t commit suicide earlier. We need instead to consider the full-cycle effectiveness of a life, not measure it by its fifteen-minutes of fame. And part of that measure – harder still to quantify – is the impact of that life on other lives: not how great a life was seen to be or claimed to be, but the cost of that fame and fortune measured by the misery it created for and in the lives of others.

We need … to consider the full-cycle effectiveness of a life, not measure it by its fifteen-minutes of fame.

Of course, cries of indignation will greet such a suggestion because we all know that we cannot possibly perform such measurements with any degree of reliability; but there will also be cries of indignation occasioned by the observation that the candles that burn twice a brightly for half as long are frequently responsible (but have we checked our facts here?) for the initiatives that bestow enormous benefits on others. We gawp collectively at the castles and palaces of the supposedly great and ignore the misery of the lives of the slaves and peasants who built them, and we continue to do so even when we become aware of their birth in oppression and tyranny. We do the same for the millionaire industrialists of the nineteenth-century who built fortunes on the misery of their workers. We gawpers are all, in a sense, closet fascists, tacitly giving our approval to behaviour that we would not tolerate for a second were it to be repeated today. Or so we like to think.

In reality, of course, we do precisely that: we tolerate despotic and tyrannical behaviour that produces palaces and the equivalents of modern castles when we tolerate the huge inequalities that capitalism generates, fortunes earned by the exploitation of the labour of others under the euphemism of economic necessity. (A passing nod is in order to the equally tyrannical excesses of communist and socialist systems in which peasants were treated like slaves and even the freedom to dissent was ruthlessly circumcised and controlled, starting with an authoritarian and totalitarian education system in which all expressions of dissent were suppressed from the earliest ages.)

Now all this may seem like a rant taking us off at a tangent to our main theme, “grammar schools”. But it is directly related and relevant because the underlying principles that would lead us to endorse a return to grammar schools are the same as those that would endorse a severely stratified society, whether based on wealth or merit. And here we start to get closer to our goal of understanding, as a preliminary requirement, what educational success amounts to.

I have written elsewhere about the essential role of meta-narratives in evaluating educational (or any other) theory or practice: only when contextualised by an accepted meta-narrative do questions about such things as success and effectiveness make sense. Finding an answer to the question of educational success therefore presupposes a meta-narrative; evaluating the full-cycle effectiveness of a life requires such a meta-narrative; forming an integrated view of what constitutes a successful intervention using something like Richard Feynmann’s “sum over histories” to evaluate its consequences requires a meta-narrative. And the key question that measures of success must ask is “What kind of human being do we think people should be?”

And this is really the point: education arises from, mirrors and embodies the kind of society it aspires to create. An education staffed by generous, enthusiastic, intellectually hungry teachers will produce a society of generous, enthusiastic, intellectually hungry citizens; an education system that models human well-being in terms of respect, dignity, equality of regard, fairness, justice and open-mindedness will produce a society where the same values prevail; an education system that does not judge us by our ability at 11, or 14, or 16, but gives us endless chances to learn and fail and be disappointed and succeed and triumph will produce a society of resilient, determined, hard-working, visionary citizens who will collectively and individually make the world a better place.

None of this can be achieved if we do not rise to the challenge of creating the kinds of schools (and universities) that will encourage the emergence of citizens whose characteristics mirror the generosity, enthusiasm, intellectual hunger and personal integrity of those whom we identify and resource to staff them. Those schools will not seek to determine in advance who are to be the most successful and the least because there is no reliable method by means of which such matters can be determined; instead they will endeavour to give every human child the best chance possible to make of its life what it can and will.

On Teaching

It is common knowledge that education is important, but it is less commonly known that it is the single largest area of human expenditure world-wide, worth something like $5.5 trillion per annum of which about half is spent on pre-university education. That this is so despite the fact that it has almost no robust measures of output and effectiveness or even any clear understanding of what it is aiming to achieve, is remarkable to say the least.

That there is money to be made from education is in no doubt: chains of schools are being created across the globe that charge substantial amounts for education of no directly-measurable quality and aim to make substantial profits from it. This is not the place for that argument; my purpose is different.

Look at the website of almost any school and you will find, either there on the home page or not more than one level below it, some sort of assertion to the effect that “this school aims to make the most of every child, to enable them to discover and maximise their potential in whatever area of human endeavour they are interested”. Shortly after this you will be taken to pictures of happy, smiling children, shown pictures of science laboratories, swimming-pools, gymnasia, and probably treated to some kind of potted summary of recent examination results and university entrance statistics.

What you will almost certainly not find is any kind of serious discussion of how the school proposes to “make the most of every child”, or any detailed description of the qualities of teaching that will make the education on offer effective.

This marketing procedure amounts to an exercise in misdirection – the technique conjurors use to direct the attention of their gullible audiences to the things that do not matter while they are engaged in their wizardry elsewhere – in that it directs the attention of potential parents and students to precisely the things that will not make a difference to them during their time at the school. Because the best-kept secret in education, a secret that is in practice not a secret at all but with which we all collude with the pretence that it is not even the case, is that quality of teaching is the only thing that really matters in a school. We can focus the attention of potential clients on laboratories and libraries and computers and swimming-pools, but they will make absolutely no difference to any student unless there is a human being – preferably a well-integrated army of such human beings – to make the connection between facilities and buildings and location and the things that really make the difference: human engagement, interaction and inspiration.

Quality of teaching is the only thing that really matters in a school.

It follows that the recruitment, professional development and retention of outstanding staff who are great teachers, who deliver quality teaching day-in, day-out for years, is the single most important thing that any school does. Why, then, do these matters so often receive such minimal attention? Heads often delegate recruitment to HR departments or deputies; professional development is often a reaction to necessity rather than a matter of integrated strategic policy; staff retention is assumed but staff are neither nurtured nor cared for. Yet if quality of teaching is the only thing that really matters in a school, all these things are more important than anything else the school does. Schools are in a double sense in the business of raising human capital: raising children to enable them to become mature, responsible, confident adults equipped to do what life will demand of them; raising staff who are ready with the intellectual hunger, inspirational enthusiasm and generosity of time and talent needed to achieve what their younger charges require.

The single thing that best defines and most effectively measures quality of teaching is the personal engagement between staff and students. Enthusiasm is infectious; generosity is contagious. Intellectual hunger comes from an insatiable need for new understanding that is as persistent and lifelong as the need for food. Without it, a teacher is not learning, and when a teacher is not learning, that teacher is not teaching.

The single thing that best defines and most effectively measures quality of teaching is the personal engagement between staff and students.

Schools that claim to “make the most of every child” who do not also aspire to “make the most of every teacher” – and in fact this should be “make the most of every member of staff” – are guilty either of naivety or hypocrisy, because it is not possible to make the most of one without making the most of the other.

There are two things that monitor and measure the effectiveness of education better than any others, and certainly better than examinations: the quality of reflection and the quality of tuition (which I am using here in a semi-technical sense that will shortly be explained).

John Dewey wrote in his Experience and Education (1938) that what turns experience into education, what turns mere experience into education, is reflection, the quality by means of which we make the experience our own and build it into our subsequent outlook on life. Without reflection, experience remains mere experience, just something that happens but not something that enables us to learn and grow.

Reflection converts mere experience into educational experience.

By tuition we mean not teaching itself, but the kind of close pastoral adult-student relationship that arises from small-scale engagement in tutorials where a small number of students meet with one or, better, a small number of staff. These sessions facilitate reflection by enabling students to think creatively about what they have experienced. Tuition ensures that, in a sense, there can be no bad experiences, no unprofitable or worthless experiences, because even an experience of failure where some proposed project does not materialise or does not come off well or does not come off at all can still be the stuff of reflection as we learn what went wrong, why it went wrong, and how to do better in future. Done successfully, tuition therefore inculcates an invaluable life-skill: it teaches us how to make the most of any and every situation we will ever encounter; it enables us to see that rather than having “a bad day” we are just having a day which requires us to learn lessons we have not learnt before in ways we have not mastered before.

Tuition converts every experience into a learning-experience by enabling reflection.

But because the skills required in both reflection and tuition are not generally natural, both need to be acquired, and it is the responsibility of schools to provide the means that will enable staff to become strong tutors in order that as tutors they can enable students to reflect (and there is no reason why tuition should only be offered by professional teachers; it can be offered by any suitably-minded member of staff). Where neither reflection nor tuition are strong, there you have what is almost certainly a failing school, however strong its results may be.

It follows that the place where schools succeed or fail is in the way they embrace professional development, because they are most unlikely to be able to recruit staff who already have these skills; all they can do is hope to recruit staff who are ready, willing and able to acquire them when provided with the opportunity.

On Science

There is a common belief that the closer we get to science, the closer we get to truth. This belief is commonly expressed in terms of the objectivity of science, its “over-there-ness” where it stands independently of human knowing. A friend of mine recently posted an affirmation of this on Facebook that set me thinking (mostly about why I don’t agree):

One of the great things about science is that it’s true whether we believe it or not.

This statement is based upon a set of confused ways of thinking about truth, language and reality (as well as science) that merit exploration.

First, we need to distinguish between science and the things science studies. If the statement is intended to say “things are the way they are whether we believe it or not”, then it might avoid some of the confusion, but not all of it (see below). Unfortunately, the way things are is not what science studies, and scientific knowledge does not consist of knowledge of the way things are, although we can be forgiven for having been led to think otherwise.

Unfortunately, “the way things are” is not what science studies.

So, second, whatever science tells us about the world is not knowledge of the world but a more or less coherent account of a set of theories about the world to which the world seems to conform under certain kinds of experience and testing as performed by certain kinds of creature with certain kinds of sensory organs. Science says more or less that if we do this and that we will experience or “see” this and that, and it provides some explanations for why this is so. But the further from mathematics science goes, which is to say from theoretical physics, the less true even this becomes, and theoretical physics is only partially and tenuously related to experimental physics. When we consider chemistry and biology the relationship between theory and experiment is more tenuous still.

Third, then, our conviction that science possesses a particular and even unique kind of truth that is true “whether we believe it or not” is based upon a mistaken attribution of the theories of science as confirmed by our best experimental practice and something as vague and philosophically problematic as “the way the world really is”. Since nobody could reasonably complain about a statement like “the world [really] is the way the world [really] is”, a science that told us how the world [really] is would be true whether we believed in or not. Unfortunately there is no such science, and never will be, and there are even more problems with a notion such as “the way the world [really] is”.

Surely, someone will ask, this “and never will be” is too strong? Surely the history of science is of a convergent discipline that increasingly renders more and more reliable, accurate and therefore true knowledge of the way the world really is? That is what we like to tell ourselves, and in a loose sense we are right, but we need to be clear about how we are also and will always be wrong.

The ideal of scientific knowledge represented in the first quotation would only and could only be achievable were we able to know things as they are when they are not being known. But it is obviously impossible to achieve such knowledge, so instead we have to settle for knowing things as they are known by the best theory we have right now. But that is quite another thing. In other words, science cannot tell us about the real world unless it describes the world as it would be when it is not being described. And “the best theory we have right now” is not something that would be true whether we believed it or not since it is a theory whose provenance depends upon our belief in and advocacy of it and which will always fall short of knowing things as they would be known were they not being known, which is to say knowing “things in themselves” as Kant put it.

There is no such thing as complete objectivity because there is no knowledge of things as they are when they are not being known.

The best science is the best account of the world that can be given by creatures constituted as we are and positioned as we are; other intelligent life might well have a completely different science that worked for them just as effectively – or not – as ours works for us despite it bearing no resemblance to our science (just as their language and conceptual apparatus would probably bear no resemblance to ours).

One of the great things about science is that its intellectual power provides us with the best theories of the world we can manage right now, …

… and another great thing about it is that it provides a defining quality of what our species takes to be a rational mind.

Of course, whether an alien civilization is bound to have discovered the same mathematics and know the value of pi is an altogether different matter for another occasion.

What constitutes “the best” theories of the world depends upon a point of view. For some, “the best” means those that give greatest control and predictability; for others it means those with the greatest scope; for yet more it means those that afford most security and reassurance.

There will be those who want to defend scientific objectivity and truth by saying something like “Well, yes, if you set impossibly high standards for scientific objectivity, such as that it should describe the world as it is when it is not being described, science can never achieve objectivity; but the problem is that your standards are absurd precisely because they are unattainable.” To which one would happily agree but for the fact that as soon as one turned one’s back the old version of objectivity – the one that says that what science says would be true whether we believed it or not, for example – instantly reasserts itself. And there is no science that can satisfy this criterion or be true to this notion of objectivity because if nobody believed what science says there would be no science. Yes, of course there would still be a world – we can debate that somewhere else, if you like – but there would be nothing at all that we could say about it that would satisfy the kinds of standards that would make what we say of it true in this person-independent sense.

The only way out of the dilemma is to stop believing in something that remains true even if nobody believes it, which is to say, to stop believing in an unrealisable kind of objectivity.

At this point someone usually stamps their foot and says “Yes, but surely you believe that there is still a world, even if we can’t say anything about it?” To which one can really only gives Ludwig Wittgenstein’s brilliant reply, “Nothing will do as well as something about which nothing can be said” (Philosophical Investigations) because if we can’t say anything about the world, what does it mean to say we believe in it?

On Happiness

An article by Emily Sargent in The Sunday Times weekend supplement on Sunday, August 6th, 2016, called “Why are the millenials so unhappy?” failed to answer its own question convincingly. Leaving aside the question whether millenials are less happy than anyone else – it is at least arguable that they are not – it raises the more general question of the source of happiness and its significance. It is not – contrary to popular belief and the opinions of the author of the article – completely self-evident that happiness is even a desirable state to aim for.

What is happiness? If “to be happy” is to be living the life one wants to live, rather than the life circumstance forces upon us, then it is one thing; if it is to experience life as a persistent frothy pleasure-garden, it is another. None of this, of course, is at all new: Aristotle thought about it more and better than most in the Nichomachean Ethics over 2,000 years ago, and came to the conclusion that eudaemonia as he called it (literally good-spirited-ness) consisted of opportunity to spend one’s life contemplating truth on an adequate but modest income (a summary borrowed from Alasdair MacIntyre). Later writers have developed eudaemonism as the pursuit of self-interest (Hobbes) and service of others (Mill), thus setting up the eternal tension between self-centredness and other-centredness as the purpose of life and the source of happiness.

But let us return to our unhappy millenials, because whatever happiness may be, and whether or not it is a legitimate objective of the mature and wise life of a citizen in a free society, any strong sense that it is either not achieved or, more alarmingly, not achievable, presents serious challenges to the social and political stability of a society.

In “On Storytelling” I make the point that most human activity only makes sense within a framework defined by some kind of over-arching story, some meta-narrative, that integrates all our other stories and purposive discourses. In particular, in order to be able to understand our existence to any extent at all, we need to be able to tell our personal story as a part in a greater story. (I will turn to the question of the possibility of a completely narcissistic self-centred and self-generated story subsequently.) When we are unable to locate ourselves in such a meta-narrative – and it is very important to appreciate that we do not need to do so consciously and deliberately, and usually do not – we are unable to satisfy any of the conditions that might be construed as happiness because those conditions will necessarily appear empty.

We used to be able to take some such meta-narrative for granted: it was the Judaeo-Christian story; it was the British Empire; it was the East-West stand-off; it was various thinly-veiled metaphors for what everyone thought to be “success” according to a particular socio-economic meta-narrative. All of these stories have gone, the latter least surprisingly because it was never a real meta-narrative in the first place but just took a couple of centuries to be exposed as the fraud it was. So what do we now do? The angst exhibited by our millenial soul-searching is only more pronounced because their exposure to older meta-narratives has left even less residue than it has with older fogies who can still remember religious, imperial and economics metaphors with sufficient force to allow them some continuing influence, albeit either illusory or delusory. But millenials – perhaps there is a clue in the name – have had no exposure to any of the defining meta-narratives that have shaped our world, and therefore have no over-arching story within which to make sense of their lives. A glance at the trivia that passes for journalism in today’s papers confirms that it is predominantly negative, dismissive, complaining and prejudiced; there is no substance to it at all because there is no meta-narrative within and on which it can find any purchase.

Recent events serve only to emphasise the seriousness of the situation. The Brexiteers had a story to sell of island Britain standing against the bureaucratic forces that are wresting power from Westminster and locating it in Brussels; the Remainers had no such compelling story, and certainly failed to tell it persuasively if they did. It mattered not one jot that the Brexit story was a lie, or rather a network of lies; what mattered was that it was easy to understand and had a simple three-word slogan everyone could grasp: “Take Back Control”. Over the pond the most frightening thing about the Trump campaign is that it tells a story over against which Clinton has nothing to offer; the story may be incoherent, racist, prejudiced, demonic and ignorant, but it is a story, and the fear is that bad and destructive stories will win if there are no good and constructive stories to set over against them. And it has an effective, if vacuous, slogan: “Make America Great Again!” or, worse, “Just nuke ’em!” On that count, Clinton is a busted flush offering reasoned, socially-orientated arguments for long-term economic growth that nobody can get enthusiastic about. The most extreme and distorted elements that proclaim themselves Islamic also have a story to tell so powerful that it lures innocents to offer themselves as suicide-bombers and assassins in pursuit of momentary infamy because their meta-narrative provides them with a justification for such action that over-rides even the value of life itself, their own and that of others. And it is important also to realise that these outrages (as we right-minded people call them with our vague recollections of an alternative meta-narrative) are not the actions of people who are mentally ill or deranged – to think this is fundamentally to misunderstand terrorism – but the actions of people who are rationally persuaded by the power of a story which nowadays “civilization” has nothing to set against.

Of course, this reveals the dark side of narrative theory: that it is not the presence of a story in itself that occasions the good, for there are stories that occasion and justify what some of us would regard as the unspeakably bad. So it cannot be our objective merely to rediscover or reanimate our older meta-narratives, or merely to invent new ones – the invention of a new meta-narrative is not the stuff of an afternoon’s work, anyway – but to weave together the best of the past and the present to create whatever future meta-narratives we may think it worth living by. And if and when we can invent them – and it is a big “if” and an urgent “when?” – they will need to be at least as compelling as the stories told by the advocates of Isis without reproducing the horrors that civilization once endorsed when it thought positively of the Inquisition. And, of course, pace Donald Trump, Adolf Hitler, Lenin, Napoleon and Thomas de Torquemada, there is always the danger that if we do not find a positive, uplifting, noble meta-narrative, someone will enthusiastically offer us a very dark alternative to fill our purposive void.

Millenials or not, if the millenials are unhappy, it should concern us all.


The Stretch Cycle

Experiential learning – and what other kind of learning is there? – relies at its most basic upon four components: a safe environment from which to launch exploration; the hunger to discover and learn new things; the occasion to experience new things within a measured, controlled space; the opportunity to reflect on those experiences in a way that permits us to incorporate the reflection into the enhanced place from which the adventure began.

All this can be summarised conveniently in what I call The Stretch Cycle, a cycle that turns out to be more or less ubiquitous in all aspects of education.


Take the sequence we follow every day: we start in the comfort of our beds and home; we are motivated to get out of bed and/or leave home to do some business in the rest of the world; that business may occasion some discomfort and should do so if we are learning and making some kind of progress, and we are to some extent out of balance; but there are limits to how much we can experience and deal with, so we eventually make our way back towards our comfort, rebalancing our lives and accommodating our experiences in a process of reflection, to arrive back in our comfort zone but changed and enriched and strengthened. (We will look at where this process can become destructive, negative and stressful later on.)

On a day-to-day basis this is cycle is commonplace and unremarkable, but we less commonly identify the same process in other areas of life. For example, every lesson we teach in a school should follow the same sequence, perhaps several times. We take students (and, if we are good teachers, we also take ourselves), from a position of relative comfort through a process of exploration, discovery, challenge, absorption, accommodation and back to a position of comfort but in an enhanced place. Teachers also take themselves through this cycle because if they are not experiencing the learning process themselves, however many times they may have taught a particular topic, they are almost certainly not teaching it well either.

However many times we have taught a topic, we should always teach it as if we have never taught it before.

Where lessons do not follow such a pattern it is hard for experience to become learning. Things can break down in many ways:

  • Some students will be reluctant to leave their comfort zone at all, which represents a motivational dysfunction;
  • Some students will find being challenged in a process that unbalances them and makes them need to revise what they already know or assume unpleasant and threatening, which is a dysfunction of safety and trust;
  • Some students will not want to experience whatever new ideas or adventures are on offer because they will touch an area of uncertainty or fear in them that they are unwilling to tackle at that time, for example someone who gets to an airport but then finds themself unable to board the plane; this is a dysfunction of capacity;
  • Some students, even when they have left their comfort zone and had new experiences, will be reluctant to reflect deeply on them in a way that converts them from being mere experiences into being learning experiences; this is a dysfunction of growth and change.

Effecting the transitions between each of the four phases of the stretch cycle requires the teacher as facilitator to understand what can enhance and what can inhibit these processes. Too much imbalance, too challenging a discomforting experience, experiential overload that requires too long to be absorbed and accommodated, and too large a distance between one level of comfort and the next can each not only inhibit the effectiveness of the process, but destroy it, even turning it into something destructive and negative.

Experienced teachers know which areas of their syllabus will occasion more or less difficulty and they adjust the speed with which they deliver them accordingly. But too much new material can have a devastating effect on student confidence and make further progress even with easier material very difficult to achieve. Moreover, each student will have different capacities for absorption of new experiences, will start from different positions of comfort (and sometimes will not be at all comfortable), and will be more or less willing to engage with the learning objectives. Some students will accept on trust that the teacher is taking them somewhere they need to go; others will question whether they need to go there at all other than in grudging acceptance of the requirements of the syllabus.

So in addition to managing the four phases of the stretch cycle, we need to deal with an additional four transitions and the things that may enhance or inhibit them. We also need to be able to assess the travel from one level of comfort to the next if we are to make a wise decision about how much new material to cover and how challenging to make the new experiences that need to be absorbed. And we need to do this for each student, insofar as it is possible (which is often not very much).

It is worth considering the equivalent cycle in connection with other processes. What, for example, is the relationship between education and society? What seems clear is that the values and practices of education both influence and are influenced by the political expectations of society and the kinds of citizenship that society expects.


Here education is seen by society as a way of inculcating it values, and that involves a transition from living how we like to living how society wants us to live; society in its turn attempts to regulate what education inculcates, expecting education to embody the same values and ideals that society espouses. So a totalitarian society will regulate its educational institutions to support  acceptance of the authority of teachers as a model of acceptance of the authority of the state; a liberal society will encourage education to promote free and critical thinking. Whether in the final analysis education creates society or society creates education is a moot point; probably they emerge together, but what is certain is that a state that becomes aware that its education system is changing the parameters of citizenship – for example from the acceptance of to the questioning of authority – will move quickly to impose tighter controls over it.

The tension between education and training adds further complexity to this interdependence. Commercial and industrial interests constantly complain, in a way that has not changed for at least two hundred years since the education of the masses began, that education does not produce sufficiently literate and numerate students. This complaint is based upon the perception that the purpose of education is to provide the employees that commerce and industry need, but this is to confuse education with training. To be prosperous, societies need trained employees, but not necessarily educated employees; in some more totalitarian or authoritarian societies the notion that citizenship involves education would be greeted with horror: an education population is much more difficult to control than a trained population because training by definition meets the needs of society whereas education does not necessarily do so. Remember Socrates, accused of “corrupting the youth of Athens” by encouraging them to think for themselves.

Unfortunately, matters are not quite that simple, especially in a rapidly-changing world. When education and training could remain unchanged for long periods of time, typically working-lifetimes, it was perfectly possible to train someone in youth and leave them to work without much further training for forty or fifty years. Now that the world is changing so rapidly, this is no longer the case, and we need a more dynamic relationship between education and training in which education advances capacity that is then brought to bear in a process of convergence into training, and training is itself enhanced by a divergent process that turns it back into education. Without this dynamic, training quickly becomes obsolete and education quickly becomes unproductive and irrelevant.


But even this needs further qualification depending on how far from the needs of contemporary training education goes and how far the needs of contemporary training can fall behind education. By and large the population, and education, have been wrong-footed by the rise of the digital revolution, for example, so now the complaint is not just that education does not supply sufficiently numerate and literate adults, but that they are not digitally savvy either (notwithstanding their adeptness at social media).

This training-education cycle maps onto the stretch cycle in an obvious way: education here consists of the challenging processes that unbalance our comfort; training consists of the regular processes that confirm it. Divergence arises from unbalancing ourselves; convergence arises from reflecting on and accommodating new experiences.

When we consider the creative dimension of citizenship we find ourselves with a different cycle, although one that still exhibit the same characteristics.


Here education provides us with the received knowledge, skills and ideas from the past, and imagination puts them together in ways that stretch them and unbalance them in a process that leads to creation. Some of the creation is more successful than others, and so reflection brings us back to a new educational body of understanding that enhances what can be passed on having refined it against the successes and failures of the creative process.

Where education fails to generate imaginative activity – where we rest content with the skills and knowledge of the past but make no attempt to extend them to deal with the question how we are to create the future – it does not add to the reservoir of human knowledge and achievement, and so it cannot rise to the challenge of creating the future. So education is forever balancing the demands of training and the challenges of creativity.


So we address the question whether the skills we need to understand the past are sufficient to create the future using a model of education that encompasses both convergent and divergent learning, imaginative and reflective creativity. And all are embraced by The Stretch Cycle.

On Storytelling

Elsewhere we have seen that it is one of the primary functions of education to help us to redefine our meta-narratives, the over-arching stories by means of which we make sense of our lives, and in particular to do so in circumstances where changes in the world render our existing stories inadequate.

Part of my argument was that liberal education – the kind espoused by the International Baccalaureate and by the United World Colleges – basically lacks a compelling meta-narrative. Both organisations think otherwise because they believe in the values Kurt Hahn advocated, and especially making education a force for peace and sustainability. But they are blind to the limitations of peace and sustainability that are exposed by their lack of a meta-narrative that defines the kind of peace and the kind of sustainability for which they strive. Under such circumstances the things they nobly advocate – diversity, tolerance, responsibility, reflection and the ideal of creating a better world – fall foul of the lack of a framework within which it is possible to understand diversity, tolerance, responsibility, reflection or the nature of a better world. While we are sick we want to be healthy just as while we are at war we want to be at peace, but neither a state of health nor a state of peace is capable of generating the conditions which give them meaning unless they are experienced within the structures of a meta-narrative that gives them meaning.

The problem for the IB and for the UWC movement, in other words, is that they are so frightened of becoming in some sense or other quasi-religious on the one hand (although they have become exactly that in the minds of some of their more devoted advocates) and so frightened of being imperialistic on the other (despite their blindness to their own embodiment of the fundamental imperialism of western liberalism) that they deny themselves any capacity to generate or be defined and guided by a meta-narrative that could possibly give them meaning and provide the framework within which diversity, tolerance, responsibility, reflection and the nature of a better world could be defined.

A typical and probably universal characteristic of this kind of deficiency – not of vitamins or nourishment but of persuasive and pervasive intelligible meaning – is that a movement comes to be defined by what it stands against rather than what it stands for, and draws its energy from burning what it hates. The problem, as Lesslie Newbiggin once said so powerfully of the Enlightenment, is that because it fuelled its flames on the wood of Christianity, when the fuel was exhausted the fire died. And that is the problem with all movements that define themselves over against something without having the courage to define a meta-narrative that gives shape and meaning to themselves: in the embers of the funeral-pyres that mark their triumph over what they oppose can always be discerned the lack of passion, the ennui, that will ensure their own death.

Although conceived in the context of education, this thesis can equally be applied to other phenomena, and most starkly to the recent tragedy of the United Kingdom and the Pyrrhic victory of the Brexiteers. The point, on the one hand, is that the Brexit campaigners had a story, albeit a completely crazy story (but that a story is crazy does not mean that it will not be popular): the story of taking back control of Britain, of reconstituting a long-lost greatness, of re-establishing something called Britishness over against its dilution with supposed tidal waves of immigrants with allegiances to other cultures and religions. And the other point, on the other hand, is that the EU campaigners had no such compelling story because Europe itself has no compelling story: it is a coalition of self-interest ruled by bureaucrats none of whom is capable of articulating any kind of meta-narrative over against the crazy meta-narratives being invented by nationalists across the continent that will undoubtedly tear the European Union apart.

On the other side of the Atlantic we can see a different version of the same phenomenon: people would rather hitch their wagon to an incoherent decisiveness however irrational than wallow in the undifferentiated soup of reasoned meaninglessness.

Just as with the IB and the UWC, the EU is terrified both of becoming quasi-religious and of becoming imperialistic, and so it has steadfastly refused to define a meta-narrative, a story, within the structure of which to give itself real meaning, real purpose and real backbone. It was born, two generations removed, from a desire to avoid a repetition of the horrors of war that scarred the twentieth-century, but it is in danger of incubating precisely the conditions in which the extremism that leads to war can germinate and grow. In particular, it is creating conditions in which the meta-narratives of the far right or even perhaps the far left, although at the moment that seems less likely, will fill a vacuum and supply populations weakened by prosperity and disenchanted with a wilderness of purposelessness with something to believe in. Such populations will always be susceptible to the kind of platitudinous lies that enabled the Brexiteers to win despite having absolutely no coherent plan for what to do having done so.

Which brings us back to the role of education in defining not just any meta-narrative, but a positive meta-narrative capable of galvanising the resolve of those who wish the world to be a better place in the face of those who exhibit instead only the characteristics of nihilistic opportunism. Without such meta-narratives we have no defence against the forces of darkness that arise from, represent and reinforce the meta-narratives of destruction. And in that case the world is in a more precarious state now than it has been since the rise of National Socialism and the publication of Mein Kampf.

On Nietzsche

Nietzsche presented the world with what is essentially a simple choice: either choose to allow yourselves to be defined by something that you regard as essentially outside of and other than yourselves, or choose to define yourselves. He chose the latter unequivocally and regarded as weak and feeble anyone who chose the former. For Nietzsche, to define oneself is to take command of one’s own humanity, and to take command of one’s own humanity is to become fully human, some semblance at least of the Übermensch.

Unfortunately, there is a paradox here: even the Übermensch must define himself or herself according to some set of parameters, some story, some meta-narrative, even if that narrative has been self-generated. In other words, even das Übermensch must regulate itself in relation to some super-story that gives shape and meaning to life and existence; otherwise, there can be no purpose and no reason to do or say or write anything.

Nietzsche falls foul of the same blind-spot that Descartes could not see through: that one must use language, and one must define one’s use of language in relation to some purpose. Descartes thought language was not a social construct, or perhaps more properly we should say failed to see that it was; Nietzsche fails to see that meaning is similarly a social construct, and therefore the product of a story that we choose to tell and choose to take seriously. There can be no question of a compelling self-sufficient, self-authenticating story that somehow obliges us to live by it and to measure ourselves according to it, for to admit that would be to reintroduce the externally-defined meaning that it was Nietzsche’s entire life-work to repudiate.

Of course, Nietzsche would say and does say that the authenticity of speech comes from the act of speaking and requires no other authentication: for him we each become essentially our own god, whose speaking is creation; Meister Eckhart would have said the same thing centuries earlier had he lived long enough.

But there is a convergence here, a limit-point upon which hinges and changes much of our understanding of the world: the distinction between defining ourselves in relation to something external and something internal is bogus; both amount to the same thing: we have no choice but to choose. Sartre essentially saw this in his notion of bad faith, mauvais fois: that to pretend we have no choice when we have nothing but choice, nothing but freedom and being condemned to freedom, is the ultimate human self-deception, folly, lie and sin. So even if we pretend to ourselves that we are defined by something external to ourselves, we lie to ourselves: we are defined by what we choose to be defined by. So there is no difference between external and internal; there is only a difference between honesty and self-deception. No story has the power to authenticate itself; only we can authenticate it. There is no difference between a belief in something external as the source of meaning and purpose and belief in something internal as that source: both must be chosen. We can pretend to ourselves that we have not chosen, that something has somehow imposed itself upon us, authenticated itself, justified itself, but it is a lie: we have chosen, one way or the other.

Nietzsche’s paradox then reduces to the question of how we resolve conflict: what do we do when our choices differ? Das Übermensch must face this challenge because it cannot be avoided: once to rely upon or appeal to some higher authority, some self-authenticating and definitively authoritative source is to recreate God in some form as an ultimate external power; so we must find an alternative resolution to conflict, and hope that it is something other than war conceived as an end to war. (Or should we even instead embrace war as therefore unavoidable?)

Some choose their own way but most choose the way others have chosen as a poor substitute for the ways an earlier generation would have thought of the ways God has chosen. So the paradox reduces to a response to a simple command: choose! For Nietzsche we are defined by what we choose; there is no right or wrong, no good or bad; there is only the brute facticity of the nature of the world insofar as it can be shaped or determined by our choices. “Right” and “wrong” are labels we give as short-cuts to socially-agreed practices; sometimes we agree with those practices and sometimes we do not; sometimes we need to change society’s views and in so doing change what is called right and wrong; saying I do or believe or say something because it is right only means because I believe it or because society believes it. What matters is that I say it or deny it; that is its right and mine. The only thing that can prevent me from saying what I wish to say is fear for myself or those I love; but to be silenced by fear is not to acknowledge the right, only to flee in the face of the wrong.

Of course every society tries to absolutise its own rights and wrongs; that is ultimately what it does when it projects them upon some external being it calls its god. But there is all the difference in the world between accepting that something is right or wrong by society’s current lights and allowing that it is right or wrong according to the transcendent perception of some all-knowing, all-seeing eternal timeless being: the difference is that between a temporary conviction or aberration and an everlasting truth.

So what we might call “Nietzsche’s Fork”, the choice between an externally- and internally-defined source of authority, is really a disguised form of an entirely different fork: the choice between integrity and – what?, how odd that English, that has words for almost everything, doesn’t really have a word for it! – disingenuousness, perhaps, hypocrisy on another reading, but we probably need a neologism like disintegrity; rather more lamely between authenticity and inauthenticity. We can pretend that we are forced to believe something from an external source, but this is just self-deception: there is only our choice; and the choice is between integrity and disintegrity, hypocrisy or self-deception.

But let us return to the Master …

We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason. We have never looked for ourselves, so how are we ever supposed to find our- selves? How right is the saying: ‘Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also’; our treasure is where the hives of our knowledge are. As born winged-insects and intellectual honey-gatherers we are constantly making for them, concerned at heart with only one thing – to ‘bring something home’. As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called ‘experiences’, who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough time? I fear we have never really been ‘with it’ in such matters: our heart is simply not in it and not even our ear! On the contrary, like somebody divinely absent-minded and sunk in his own thoughts who, the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed into his ears, wakes with a start and wonders ‘What hour struck?’, sometimes we, too, afterwards rub our ears and ask, astonished, taken aback, ‘What did we actually experience then?’ or even, ‘Who are we, in fact?’ and afterwards, as I said, we count all twelve reverberating strokes of our experience, of our life, of our being – oh! and lose count . . . We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are, the motto ‘everyone is furthest from himself’ applies to us for ever, we are not ‘knowers’ when it comes to ourselves . . .

Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Preface §1.

What can one say? We are unknown to ourselves because the bee-gatherer has no interest in anything that has not already been conceived to be of value to the hive, which is to say what it has not already been taught to think of value to the hive: no experience is worth reflecting upon that does not immediately appeal to prior knowledge, which is to say, prejudice. This is the paradox of education, that the knowledge we acquire of and from the past can appear to important to those blind to the requirements of the future. The twelve strokes of midday make no impression on us; we wake and ask what time it is, but it is already too late. “The watchman waketh, but in vain” (Ezekiel, 33:34???)

I had not read the Genealogy when in the mid 1990s in Princeton I wrote the first (and so-far only) draft of Between Silence and the Word: A Study in Creation. But the opening line echoes Nietzsche’s in the Genealogy: “We do not know ourselves very well; neither, fortunately for us, does God”. We are not “knowers” when it comes to ourselves, says Nietzsche, but neither are we completely ignorant, as he supposes. Fragments of who we are emerge as we act and speak, but other actions and words consist only of lies. This dichotomy, this “fork”, is what defines us: that between integrity and hypocrisy, between owning what we have done and said, and pretending, in our own personal version of Sartre’s “bad faith”, that we were not free, or not responsible, or not informed, or, like Pooh Bah in The Mikado, “not there”. We are altogether too preoccupied with and blinded by the need to “bring something home” to see the opportunities that might come to us were we to stay out there in the world.

The more we think about it, the more clearly we can see that we are blinded by not one but several (indeed, innumerable) layers of self-deception, and perhaps there is no greater folly than to believe that in having removed only one layer of self-deception we can then see clearly. On the contrary: there is no greater self-deception than to believe the we can measure the extent of our own blindness. We are as a prisoner who, in escaping from his cell, forgets that he has yet to break out of the dungeon and scale the walls of his prison. We are as those chained and compelled to watch forever the shadows in Plato’s cave who, in breaking their chains and escaping from the darkness, are blinded by refracted light and do not see that the cave is situated atop a precipice in a desert wherein can be found no life.

“We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers”: but is it with good reason, or is our reason only another layer of our blindness? Certainty, clarity of thought, can come to us by virtue of a number of strategies: one can simply be to refuse to consider any further the possibility that we might be wrong. But we can always be wrong, and the price we pay for escaping from the inevitability that we might be wrong is to guarantee that we are wrong by making up our minds.

And this is really the point of “We do not know ourselves very well; neither, fortunately for us, does God”: that even God can be wrong, which is to say that whatever metaphor we choose to employ to describe the source of our greatest certainty, cannot escape from the possibility that we might be wrong. And any “theology” that imputes the kind of perfection to God that exempts God from being condemned to this kind of uncertainty “by definition” is no more than a projection into the divine of a human hankering after a final certainty. There is no certainty: that is our fate and the source of our life.

Nietzsche started his life as a student of theology and those studies never left him; his writing is completely saturated with metaphors and allusions that arise from the world-view of the very Judaeo-Christian tradition he despised. But in failing to escape from the metaphors of the Judaeo-Christian tradition he also failed to provide us with new metaphors through which to create different narratives in relation to which we can understand and shape our lives. So how do we create new meta-narratives to supersede the worn-out metaphors of the ancient world?

How many layers of self-deception must we remove before we begin to see more clearly, and can we be sure that even the metaphors of the ancient world will not come to seem less time-worn if we can but see them in a new light?

Here is the Master once again, peeling away another layer of the existential onion:

So let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined – and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed (morality as result, as symptom, as mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison), since we have neither had this knowledge up till now nor even desired it. People have taken the value of these ‘values’ as given, as factual, as beyond all questioning; up till now, nobody has had the remotest doubt or hesitation in placing higher value on ‘the good man’ than on ‘the evil’, higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general (and this includes man’s future). What if the opposite were true? What if a regressive trait lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an enticement, a poison, a narcotic, so that the present lived at the expense of the future? Perhaps in more comfort and less danger, but also in a smaller-minded, meaner manner? . . . So that morality itself were to blame if man, as species, never reached his highest potential power and splendour? So that morality itself was the danger of dangers? . . .

Nietzsche, op. cit.,  Preface §7

To which one is inclined to add, “provided it is not education that is the danger of dangers” inasmuch as, like morality, it can prevent us from creating a future by mesmerising us with the blindness of the past.